on sale now at amazon

on sale now at amazon
"I don't like this book because it don't got know pictures" Chief Rhorerer

“It’s becoming a disturbingly familiar scene in America - mentally unstable cops”

“It’s becoming a disturbingly familiar scene in America - mentally unstable cops”
“It’s becoming a disturbingly familiar scene in America - mentally unstable cops”

Once again, the point isn't in changing policy, its not hiring punk....and where did the last police chief go and why?

 

Fairfax citizens’ panel agrees with suggestions to reform police use of force policies

Megan Cloherty 


A group of volunteers who served on a community panel to analyze how  police use force in Fairfax County, Virginia, said it agrees that changes need to be made in how officers are trained and data is collected by the department.

 In looking at a study by the University of Texas at San Antonio on Fairfax County’s use of force between June 2016 and December 2018, Yolonda Earl-Thompson of the Use of Force Advisory Committee told the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors that the committee agrees with suggested changes.

 “Without cultural change, internally and externally, policy change will not make meaningful and impactful improvements for a safer community and a safer Fairfax,” Earl-Thompson said.

 Along with documenting when force is used, the panel said the department should collect data on its de-escalation techniques and educate officers on county history with a focus on generational trauma.

 “One of our overarching recommendations is to ensure that the changes are rooted and guided by trauma-informed perspectives that grants a higher value on lived experiences of communities of color, youth, residents with behavioral and substance abuse dependencies, immigrants and undocumented persons,” Earl-Thompson said in her presentation on March 1.

“These are the people most impacted by the use of force and the contact with law enforcement.”

 Those residents must be kept top of mind in retraining officers and changing the way the department collects use of force data, the committee found. It also recommended tracking instances where deadly force was authorized to reduce the risk of selection bias.

 The study analyzed 1,360 use-of-force cases from January 2016 to December 2018 and found that 42% of cases involved Black individuals, compared to 38% for white people, and Black people were 1.8 times more likely to have a weapon pointed at them by police.

 The study was released in June and given to the panel of volunteers to analyze.

 Following the committee’s presentation, Police Chief Kevin Davis informed the Board of Supervisors that the department has adopted a new ICAT (integrating communications, assessment and tactics) training guide recommended by the study and will begin to retrain officers next month.

 He also told the board that officers will train with non-lethal tools, such as BolaWraps, which can restrain suspects with minimum force.



Sex trafficking and the Fairfax County Police

 From Greenscreenvideo

 

"I've been talking about how the Fairfax County Police Department and they are this department are very corrupt months ago I was wrongfully arrested for making tick talks about an Arlington county police officer's girlfriend group that talked about violence against me stop just to recap 8 months ago I was wrongfully arrested for making tick talks about an Arlington county police officers girlfriend was part of a group that talked about violence against me and bully stopped and harassed me after filing police report through the Arlington county Police Department the officers girlfriend went to the Fairfax County Police Department and had an emergency protective order filed against me this for speaking out about it on tiktok they sent four police officers to my house at 4:00 AM then she had another EP oh filed against me through the Arlington county Police Department where her boyfriend works knowing that I hadn't done anything wrong because I never even said the woman's name I filmed myself getting served the protective order and I got arrested both the Fairfax County Police Department and the Arlington county Police Department help protect this group of violent people and try to make it nearly impossible for me to speak out about it so this doesn't surprise me at all a judge ruled in court that there was absolutely zero basis for either protective orders filed against me and my charges were dropped and neither of the two night shift magistrates that filed off on these protective orders have been held accountable either have any of the Arlington county police officers who arrested me this group of people continued to harass me till this day and the police told me that they're not gonna do anything about it both of these police departments should be under investigation immediately after having my experience and seeing this I wonder what else they're hiding"

 

What she's talking about  are Virginia cops getting sex from traffic minors in exchange for protection and honestly by the grace of God she's lucky she just got arrested because as it turns out the trafficking ring went all the way as high as the police chief you see most of us are finding out about this case because of a recent lawsuit for more of the victims at the time she was twenty and she got trafficked from Costa Rica to Virginia under false pretenses but the lawsuit is actually taking information from this detective above me his name is bill wolf who was the only detective working the sex trafficking cases in Fairfax County at the time until he was arrested by all of his fellow officers and had his life and his children lives threatened bill eventually left the Police Department in 2017 to join the national human trafficking intelligence center and work for the United States government but wait I know what you're thinking why does Jane doe have to file a lawsuit if there's so much evidence against so many cops so what had happened was the FBI started investigating the leader of the sex trafficking ring a couple years later they found more evidence of police wrongdoing and turned it over to IA I stands for internal affairs of which they did absolutely nothing instead the police chief along with other high ranking lieutenants just quietly quit and got to keep their pensions

These guys are scum, they really are.....where's the State Police on this? The FBI? The Justice Department?


 

Fairfax County police accused of planting drugs...why is this not a surprise?


 

Grimes, the indicted cop


 

Charles Hewitt the cop

 




The police union is warning more officers will leave following Fairfax County’s proposed budget, which doesn’t include the pay bumps police were pushing for.

 

 Well, now we know what the community thinks of the police department so don’t let the door hit on the ass on the way out. You WILL NOT be missed.

 I think defunding police is wrong, except here. If ever there was a police department that needs the air taken out of it, it's these punks.

 






So the punk cop says to me "Go ahead, say one more fucking thing" and I thought "No, there's no damage in that,  my pen and I will wait. That's where the real damage comes into play"

Fairfax County Police union say the Fairfax County Police Department is short 160 police officers!

 

I'll take a bow for that.





So the punk cop says to me "Go ahead, say one more fucking thing" and I thought "No, there's no damage in that,  my pen and I will wait. That's where the real damage comes into play"

 

Young people, if you're considering working for the Fairfax County Police, consider this.


Fairfax County police are investigating the deaths of a department recruit and his wife and have launched an internal affairs investigation to determine whether officers who responded to the incident handled it properly, authorities said Sunday.

 Basically one of the Fairfax County Police super recruits probably killed himself and his wife.

Do you really think you want to work in an environment like that?

 



So the punk cop says to me "Go ahead, say one more fucking thing" and I thought "No, there's no damage in that,  my pen and I will wait. That's where the real damage comes into play"

 

I am amazed, really just amazed, they didn't get to keep their jobs. Im not joking

 

Court upholds firing of LAPD officers who played Pokémon Go during holdup

A California appellate court has ruled that two Los Angeles police officers were properly fired for playing Pokémon Go instead of responding to a robbery.

The court ruled on Friday that the LAPD was justified in firing Louis Lozano and Eric Mitchell for misconduct in 2017, the Sacramento Bee reported Monday.

On April 15, 2017, a video system in their patrol car captured the officers discussing how to catch a Snorlax and trying to capture the rare Togetic in the game while ignoring a report of several people who were in the process of robbing a Macy’s in the Crenshaw area, according to the ruling.

A police captain who arrived at the scene saw another patrol car parked nearby and wondered why the officers hadn’t responded and answered it himself, court documents said.

The officers claimed they hadn’t heard the radio request for backup but on the patrol car recordings, they were heard discussing whether to respond and Lozano could be heard saying, "Ah, screw it," according to the court filings.

The officers are then heard for the next 20 minutes discussing the GPS-based Pokémon augmented reality cellphone game and driving to various locations to "capture" virtual creatures, the filings said.

They were fired after a police board of rights unanimously ruled that the two officers committed misconduct that was "unprofessional and embarrassing" and violated the public’s trust.

The officers asked a court to overturn their firings, arguing among other things that the recordings of their private conversations were improperly used as evidence but the Superior Court judge denied their petition. The appeals court upheld that decision.

Don't trust the cops


 

Late Justice: The tragic case of Lamonte McIntyre

 

 



                                                       THE MURDER

It started on April 15, 1994 at about 2:00 PM. word reached Kansas City, Kansas drug lord Aaron Robinson that two junkies he was looking for, cousins Donald Ewing and Doniel Quinn, were sitting in a parked car on Hutchings Street smoking crack, crack that Robinson was sure they had stolen from him. Robinson dispatched his primary enforcer a 16-year old named Neil Edgar Jr, known on the streets as Monster, to handle the situation.

Cecil Brooks, a drug lord and cousin to Aaron Robinson, said “I personally taught Aaron the drug business. He listened carefully and learned very quickly. Aaron started out on Delavan with me, and then he broke out on his own. I told Aaron how to get his own spot. I mentored him and taught him what I knew. Aaron learned quickly. It got so that he was even better at it than me, or certainly just as good, Aaron was a natural at business. Aaron and I had a tremendous love and respect for each other.

Although Aaron and I were tight, he ran his own operation. He was good to his subordinates and associates. He never cheated and gave everyone their fair share. Aaron had a number of little cats working for him.

A man whose street name was Monster was one of those cats. Monster was about 15 or 16 years old. Monster was the kind of person who would do anything, and he loved my cousin Aaron. He would do whatever Aaron wanted him to do. People close to me told me about the wild things Monster used to do and how crazy Monster was in doing so many murders. I know of two murders that he did - the two Quinns and this white guy. Monster killed a white man over missing dope. To my knowledge, that murder is still unsolved. The victim's body disappeared and, to my knowledge, was never found. This happened sometime in the mid-1990s.

Once Monster started acting out he would then live up to his reputation and image and would do what others expected him to do. He was a 15-year-old kid who somehow got molded into what his name meant - a monster, I told Monster one time that he needed a hug. By this, I meant that he needed some love.

Monster, wearing hair braids, dressed in black, got out of the car carrying a pump shotgun got out of the car and cut across a parking lot and came up on the side of the passenger’s side of the car and unloaded the shotgun into the two men and then ran back across the lot and disappeared. Doniel Quinn who was sitting in the passenger seat died immediately. Donald Ewing was seated in the driver’s seat was pronounced dead later that afternoon at the hospital.

“Monster got paid to do the murder.” Cecil A. Brooks said “He didn't get the whole ticket. He got $500, and the rest was due him but was never paid. Monster did the murders. I know Monster did it because Aaron told me Monster was the shooter.”

Monster knew that Aaron wanted Doniel to pay for breaking into the stash house and stealing drugs." A witness later told investigator sent to reexamine the case "Monster was the one who shot and killed Doniel and the other Quinn .... Monster was a crazy kid. He knew the victims were sitting around in the area. It didn't matter to him if there were people who saw him shoot in broad daylight.

Another witness, a woman who spent a great deal of time with Monster in the months after the murders, recalled him as being a controlling, manipulative and violent man with extreme mood swings. “Monster always carried a gun, usually tucked in his waistband, and everyone knew he was prepared to use it."

Monster essentially confessed to the young woman that he stole the money and drugs from Aaron's drug spot and then pinned the crime on the Quinn boys and “also made clear to her that he had "taken care of' Aaron's problem by killing the Quinns. “

                                                   THE INVESTIGATION

A few hours after the shooting the police in expectedly arrested a 17 year old named Lamonte McIntyre for the murders of Doniel Quinn and Don Ewing. The arrest was groundless, McIntyre was miles away from the scene when the murders happened, and he could prove it. He didn’t know anyone involved in the incident. McIntyre had spent the day with two aunts who lived in adjacent houses, a mile away from the crime site, and then went to a restaurant with his mother later in the day.

“When the wrong guy got arrested” Cecil A. Brooks said “We all knew that Monster did what the other guy was arrested for. The guy who got convicted for these murders had nothing to do with it. None of us had ever heard of him. Maybe we should have stepped up and done something, but that wasn’t how it worked.”

The murder investigation conducted by the police was sloppy and lazy and illegal on several front. As an example, ejected gunshot shells were recovered from the scene of the crime in 1994 but were never examined for fingerprints. The police never sought to examine his clothing, despite witness statements that the gunman was standing right next to the car when the shots were fired and likely would have been hit by exploding glass and possibly blood.

An affidavit from the former Kansas City, Kansas, police captain Randy Eskina called his department’s investigation into the crime “Grossly deficient.” It was “unusually brief and superficial and was characterized by multiple errors, failures and deviations from accepted police practices” and that the investigations deficiencies “span several categories, resulting in the reaching of premature and unsupported investigative conclusions” so that “potentially valuable evidence was never gathered, and the entirety of the State’s case rested on two dubious eyewitnesses whose accounts were filled with discrepancies.”

Ronald Singer, a forensic scientist with the Tarrant County (Texas) Medical Examiner’s Office testified that investigators didn’t test McIntyre’s clothes for glass or blood from the crime scene or search his home for the shotgun used in the crime. They also made no attempt to find a link that would put McIntyre at the scene. They also ignored many people who told them they had the wrong man.

“In my opinion” Singer said “because Mr. McIntyre was initially linked to the scene only through eyewitness testimony, it was essential that a thorough evaluation of physical evidence available be conducted in order to support or refute the eyewitness testimony. Failure to do so potentially hampered Mr. McIntyre’s ability to prepare an adequate defense.”

The investigating detective, Roger Golubski, knew the accused Lamonte McIntyre’s mother, Rose McIntyre. According to Mrs. McIntyre, in the late 1980s Golubski coerced her into a sexual act in his office and then harassed her for weeks, often calling her two or three times a day, before she moved and changed her phone number. “He had total power, and I was terrified that he would try to force me again to provide sexual favors. I also knew that there was no one I could complain to, as Golubski was known to be very powerful in the community and in the police department.”

At least four people witnessed the brazen daylight shooting. Two of them wrongly identified Lamonte McIntyre, from a photo lineup, as the shooter. But here’s why. Police detective Roger Golubski and a second Kansas City, Kansas detective returned to the crime scene the following day to show residents the same five photographs. Three of those photos were of Lamonte McIntyre, his brother and his cousin, all three men shared a basic family similarity.

Witness Ruby Mitchell: Mitchell gave a series of contradictory identifications and descriptions to the police. She had been standing at her front door and saw the shooter walk down the hill toward the victims’ parked car carrying a short, brown handled shotgun, which was true. She said he wore all black clothing, which was true, and his hair was slicked back, which is not true he wore braids. She said saw him pump the gun and shoot into the car then he walked back up the hill. When asked “Did you see his face?’ she said “Well, he’s brown skinned, that’s all I could tell.” Although the interview was part of the official record, that statement “He’s brown skinned” was never referenced at trial.

Later that same day, Mitchell contacted police to say that she knew who the shooter was, a young man named Lamonte (Meaning the otherwise innocent Lamonte McIntyre) but she had no last name. She recalled that she had met him before, through her niece. However the Lamonte she had met was a young man named Lamonte Drain, not Lamonte McIntyre.

Det. Golubski picked up Mitchel a short while later and drove her to the police station to assist in creating a composite likeness of the shooter. After creating the composite, she identified the shooter from an array of five photos, consisting of Lamonte McIntyre, a photo of his brother, a photo of his cousin, and two photos of other young black men. The array did not include a photo of Lamonte Drain, the Lamonte who Ruby knew through his contact with her niece and had originally told police that she recognized as the shooter.

Later, Ruby reported that as Golubski had driven her to the station on the day of the murder he made her very uncomfortable, telling her she was pretty, that he enjoyed black women and asked if she dated white men. She said that the remarks made her highly uncomfortable because she knew Golubski’s reputation for intimidating black women to elicit sexual acts under threat of arrest.

Golubski, behavior was known throughout the Department. His reputation for allegedly taking care of warrants and tickets for black prostitutes, if they provided sexual favors, was also known. Many people in the community saw Golubski in the company of prostitutes and reported that he rode around in his police car with them. Witnesses eventually came forward to say his behavior and reputation caused them to lie or withhold exculpatory information.

Golubski was so involved with black female prostitutes and drug addicts that he fathered children with some of them, according to an affidavit from retired police officer Ruby Ellington who said “Roger Golubski’s involvement with them was no secret. It was simply accepted as part of what Roger Golubski was able to do without repercussion.”

Cecil Brooks, the dope peddler, recalled Golubski and said that, “On at least two occasions, I personally witnessed Detective Golubski confiscate drugs from someone and not arrest that person. Once in about 1990 a young kid named Lamont Washington and I emerged from a dope house. Golubski confronted us outside the house. He took $600 to $700 worth of cocaine that was on Lamont, and then let him go without arresting him. Golubski did the same thing at a later date when Henry Williams and I came out of a drug smoker's house. Golubski took Henry's drugs and let him go. In both instances, Golubski never searched me for drugs. He knew I never carried them on my person. We all knew that Golubski would take drugs and then give them to drug-addicted black hookers in exchange for sexual favors.” However he was never called onto the carpet for his supposed behavior, in fact, he rose through the ranks and became a captain.

Witness Josephine Quinn: Quinn lived directly across the street from the crime scene. She was an aunt to both of the victims. She and her daughter Stacy were both home and witnessed the shooting. Josephine heard three or four shots as she walked out her front door then she saw the murderer pump his gun, shoot two more times, and run away. Her daughter, Stacy ran out of the house just before the shooting because she heard her mother and uncle arguing. When she stepped outside she saw them, her mother and uncle, in the middle of the street and saw the shooter approaching the parked car that held Donald Ewing and Doniel Quinn. Stacy shouted at her mother to get down. After Monster shot out the windows, Stacy saw that her cousin, Doniel Quinn, (Donald Ewing was also her cousin) was in the car and screamed to her mother “It’s little Don,” then ran to the car while her mother called the police. The next day, Detective Golubski showed Josephine the 5 photo line-up, but she could not identify anyone in it as the shooter. She did tell Golubski that her daughter knew the shooter. Josephine Quinn said that she could not make an identification, because she was up Hutchings Street and did “not get a good look” at the shooter.

Niko Quinn. Lived three doors down from Josephine, who was her mother. Police interviewed Niko Quinn three times. A Detective Smith first interviewed her at 2:46pm the day of the murders. She reported that she had seen the killer dressed in black, with a shotgun in his hand, walk towards the victims’ parked car, shoot the victims then walk back up the hill toward Hiawatha Street. She was standing at a tree between Ruby Mitchell’s house and a vacant lot when she saw the crime. She had been on her way to her mother’s house, just past Ruby Mitchell’s house. She said that she could recognize him if she saw him again. Then Golubski interviewed her. His report describes Niko Quinn as “still visibly traumatized by what had happened.” Seeing the photo spread, he wrote, she “began shaking, became teary eyed, and was very hesitant in making any statements.”

Golubski wrote that Niko Quinn seemed to recognize the photograph of Lamonte McIntyre, the same photograph that her neighbor, Ruby Mitchell, had identified the day before. Golubski wrote that Niko Quinn “put her head down and stated that she thought that this was the individual but was not sure at this time positively. But thought it might be him.” Golubski wrote that Quinn then excused herself, and the interview was concluded.

Sometime later, Niko contacted Golubski saying she needed to meet with him again. She had noticed two men on the vacant lot near her home and worried that they were connected to the murders. Golubski said that he would help her move away and later did. They met at the high school and this time, she identified Lamonte McIntyre’s photo as the shooter.

THE TRIAL

With one positive ID that seemed to have been given in exchange for safety, and a boatload of highly suspicious otherwise weak evidence, 17-year old Lamonte McIntyre was charged with a double homicide.

It’s truly a wonder that the case went to trial at all. The police had no physical evidence connecting McIntyre to the crime. They had not produced a gun, nor conducted a search of McIntyre’s house for either the gun or the black clothing described by the eyewitnesses. Nor did they produce any evidence that McIntyre knew the victims or had a motive to kill them. Five alibi witnesses accounted for McIntyre’s whereabouts prior to, at the time of, and after the murder. Yet, Wyandotte County Assistant District Attorney Terra Morehead told the jury in her opening statement that “numerous reliable sources, people, had indicated that the individual who was responsible for this was the defendant, Lamonte McIntyre.”

Gary W. Long was the attorney appointed to defend McIntyre trial. Long was placed on supervised probation by the Kansas Supreme court shortly after being appointed as McIntyre’s lawyer for errors made in three prior cases. And those errors continued. Long never reconstructed the crime scene and there is some question as to whether he even visited the crime scene. And he should have reconstructed the crime scene because a reinvestigation of the case years later did include a reconstructed the crime scene which raised doubts that Ruby Mitchell could have clearly seen the face of the killer from where she watched the incident through the screened front door.

At a June 1994 hearing in juvenile court that served both to determine whether McIntyre should be tried as an adult and as a preliminary hearing, Niko Quinn and Ruby Mitchell made in-court identifications of McIntyre. At the close of the hearing, the juvenile court judge ruled that probable cause existed, and that McIntyre should be tried as an adult. Long didn’t interview Ruby Mitchell and Niko Quinn. Despite police reports that Stacy Quinn could identify the shooter, Long didn’t interview her either. He later said that he learned after the trial that Stacy Quinn had seen the shooting, meaning he did little or no investigation into the case before he accepted it. Long’s poor representation of clients continued, and he eventually surrendered his license. He was disbarred in 1998.

With no case, the prosecution cheated. It withheld exculpatory information. Wyandotte County District Judge J. Dexter Burdette the presiding judge in the trial, had a romantic relationship with the Terra Morehead, the prosecutor, that neither Morehead or the judge disclosed at the time. So the case came down to the testimony of the two eyewitnesses, Ruby Mitchell and Niko Quinn.

At the trial, Ruby Mitchell testified that she picked out Lamonte McIntyre’s photograph from the photo spread the cops showed her and said she did not know McIntyre’s name when she chose him out of the photo lineup. However in the original tape-recorded interview, she said she had recognized the killer, and said his name was “Lamonte McIntyre.” Remarkably, McIntyre’s lawyer failed to question her about her previous statement.

Both Detective Golubski and Police Lieutenant Dennis O. Barber testified that they had obtained McIntyre’s name from “various sources” but failed to provide specifics.

A retired Kansas City, Kansas police captain, Randy Eskina, who investigated the case wrote in an affidavit that there was “nothing in the file to indicate that these sources did in fact actually exist…..The lack of proper documentation causes me to have grave doubts about the existence or reliability of any informant or tipster who supposedly provided the name of Lamonte McIntyre to the police.”

Stacy Quinn (Josephine Quinn’s daughter) who had the best view of the shooter, did not testify at trial. She was never even interviewed by the police and is was alleged to have had an ongoing sexual relationship with Detective Golubski. Stacy was a questionable witness anyway. She admitted on the stand that she was currently in custody, held on a parole violation following a theft conviction. And she admitted she used drugs, though she said her head was clear the day of the shooting.

Niko Quinn told Assistant District Attorney Morehead that McIntyre was not the shooter when she saw him in the courthouse. According to the Quinn, Morehead threatened her with contempt charges and said she would have Family Services take her child away if she changed her story, so identified McIntyre as the killer. Morehead then committed what are called Brady violations by withholding Josephine Quinn’s evidence from the defense and the court.

Josephine Quinn, went to the court to see if her testimony was needed but Assistant District Attorney Morehead said it wasn’t, however, while in the courthouse, Quinn saw McIntyre. The next day, Quinn called Morehead and told her that McIntyre couldn’t not be the shooter; his skin was to light, he was too short and had a professional haircut. Although Morehead was required to inform the court of Quinn’s statement, dismissed her by saying that the case “is in the jury’s hands now.”

And it was but not for long. In her closing argument, Morehead told the jury that McIntyre, who didn’t know the victims, had a “vendetta” and shot victims to “settle a score,” though no evidence was presented connecting McIntyre to the victims.

The jury deliberated a few hours, then broke until the next day, when they sought to rehear the testimony of the two state’s eyewitnesses, Ruby Mitchell and Niko Quinn. Later that morning, they returned a guilty verdict. In fairness, the jury had wrestled with the conviction. One Juror, Greg Lauber, later said that he was one of the two last jurors to support a guilty verdict, and that he was never completely comfortable with the result.

The mandatory two life sentence handed out to McIntyre, who, again, was only 17 at the time, was later rued to be excessive since it was not individualized with any consideration to his clean record and his age.

MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL

(April 1996)

On June 6, 1997, Lamont McIntyre filed a post-conviction motion for a new trial contending that his original trial was not fair based on two issues - the district court's failure to give an eyewitness instructions and counsel's failure to present testimony from witnesses Keva Garcia and Willie Bush.

After McIntyre managed to rid of the incompetent Gary W. Long, the court appointed a new lawyer, Mark Sasche, to McIntyre’s case. Josephine Quinn gave Sasche, an affidavit echoing what she had told Prosecutor Morehead. She said she knew Lamonte McIntyre was not the killer because he was too tall, his skin was too dark, and his lips protruded too much. However, Sasche, for whatever reason (if, in fact, there was a reason) failed to communicate with McIntyre prior to the hearing, and once at the hearing, he failed to bring any evidence or witnesses or Quinn’s statement, or, for that matter even Lamont McIntyre, to court on January 16, 1998.

Like Gary Long, at the time Sasche represented McIntyre, Sachse was in trouble over another case he was handling. In that case, he never filed an appeal on behalf of a man he was appointed to represent who was convicted of murder, even when warned the case would be dismissed if he did not respond.

In another case, he ignored discovery requests from the opposing lawyer in a civil case Sachse had filed on behalf of a seven-year old who was injured in a car accident. The case was dismissed when Sachse failed to respond even when ordered to do so by the judge. When the family traveled weeks later for a pretrial hearing, Sachse met them at the courthouse and told them the case had been postponed; he failed to say his neglect had caused the case to be dismissed.

Those two were among seven clients who filed complaints against Sachse; in 2000, the Kansas Supreme Court adopted the findings of the disciplinary panel that Sachse had failed all seven thereby causing harm. The court ordered Sachse to serve supervised probation for two years. Six years later, the Kansas Supreme Court suspended Sachse from practice for a year after he failed to properly represent two more clients. And finally, in 2007, Sachse voluntarily gave up his license and was disbarred after disciplinary proceedings were pending against him in 17 more cases.

Still, despite that incompetence, Stacy Quinn testified at a post-conviction hearing in April of 1996, describing the shooting in detail and saying that Lamonte McIntyre could not be the murderer because he was too tall, his face was too long, and his lips were too big. She described his hairstyle as “French braids” not the style worn by Lamonte McIntyre at the time of the murder. Stacy also testified at the hearing that she had seen the real shooter twice since the murder and McIntyre had been jailed. Although he testimony clearly exonerated McIntyre, Judge Burdette rejected it as not credible. With McIntyre absent, prosecutor Morehead persuaded Judge Burdette not to grant McIntyre's motion for relief.

                                         THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE

Twenty four years passed. The case came to the attention of the New Jersey- based Centurion Ministries, which fights for wrongly convicted prison inmates who are condemned or serving life sentences.

Centurion decided to investigate the case and on an initial review found that there were so many flaws that no reasonable juror would have convicted McIntyre if all of the evidence had been provided to that jury.

On October 12, 2016 an evidentiary hearing on the motion to dismiss was convened in Wyandotte County District Court. Family members of the victims who believed Lamonte McIntyre was innocent were among the first to testify. On the second day of the hearing, Senior District Judge Edward Bouker vacated McIntyre’s conviction. The judge said his action “was to correct a gross injustice” but did he said nothing of the gross misconduct on the part of Burdette, Morehead or Golubski.

McIntyre’s case, along with several others, prompted a new Kansas law, enacted in 2018, requiring the state to compensate victims of wrongful convictions. Under the new statute, McIntyre will receive $65,000 for each of the 23 years he wrongly spent in prison, among other benefits. The court also ordered that records of his conviction and DNA profile be expunged.

McIntyre was released from prison in 2017. In October of 2018, Lamonte filed a federal civil rights suit against Golubski and 8 other police officers. In March 2019, he filed for state compensation for wrongful incarceration.

Metropolitan Community College in Kansas City, Missouri, awarded Lamonte McIntyre a full scholarship to attend college at their Penny Valley Campus. He has since earned an Associate Degree in Business Administration. While in prison, McIntyre learned to barber. He is now part-owner of a barber school he graduated from and has opened a second location in Kansas City, Missouri. He is also a board member of Miracle of Innocence, Lamonte will finish his BA degree in Business Administration in 2019. “Being charged, convicted and sent to prison has been a surreal experience, like a nightmare I can’t wake up from,” McIntyre said in a statement. “It’s hard to believe it happened, and I still struggle with the question of why. I’m all right. I’m happy, you know. I’m here thanking God. I’m thanking everybody who supported me and been here for me. It feels good. I feel good. I’m happy.”

As Saundra Newsom, murder victim Doniel Quinn’s mother, said it best “Let him find a life. Let him be at peace. Let us be at peace.”

Aaron Robinson, the drug dealer who ordered the murders, was killed in March 1996. Monster is currently serving a 33-year sentence in Missouri for murder .

Morehead left the District Attorney’s office on September 12, 2002 and became an Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Kansas. She had not faced discipline for her conduct. Golubski rose through the ranks to detective and captain. He retired cement in 2019 last year. Judge Burdette is still on the bench.

 

Watch this, it explains a lot about why almost the entire nation is fed up with policing in the new century


 

I've been saying this for a decade now, the Fairfax County Police are corrupt (part1)

  

Suit: Police officers protected sex trafficking ring in exchange for free sex

________________________________________

by Matthew Barakat/NBC Washington

 

A federal lawsuit filed by a prominent civil rights attorney alleges that police officers in Fairfax County protected a sex trafficking ring in Northern Virginia in exchange for free sex from the trafficked women.

The lawsuit also names former Fairfax County Police Chief Ed Roessler as a defendant, alleging that he helped cover up for the officers when another detective's work threatened to expose their wrongdoing.

The suit was filed on behalf of a Costa Rican woman identified in the lawsuit only as “Jane Doe.” It says the officers would tip off the trafficking ring to suspend its online advertisements in advance of sting operations run by police.

Victor Glasberg, the lawyer who filed the suit on the Costa Rican woman's behalf, said in an interview police have essentially corroborated elements of the woman's allegations by providing him the names of the officers involved in the alleged misconduct.

When Glasberg first filed the lawsuit in October, he did not know the identities of the officers who were allegedly involved, because his client was never able to learn their names. But he obtained a court order requiring the police department to identify the officers described in the complaint.

Police responded with two names: Michael O. Barbazette of Manassas and Jason J. Mardocco of Gainesville. Neither officer remains on the force.

Glasberg amended his lawsuit last week to include the officers' identities.

Calls and an email to numbers and an address associated with Barbazette went unanswered. Calls and an email to numbers and an address associated with Mardocco were not returned. Neither has a lawyer listed in court records.

Glasberg said he tried for months to negotiate with the county to avoid filing a lawsuit, because he believes a trial will be an emotional burden for his client. While he's seeking a monetary settlement for his client, Glasberg said his primary effort in negotiations was to ensure some level of accountability for the officers, but his negotiations were unsuccessful.

“I begged the county to resolve this without litigation. I said, 'Let's get some accountability here,'" he said. “In the end, they told me to go pound sand. ... This lawsuit is going to be difficult for my client, but it's going to be a whole lot more difficult for the county.”

Glasberg's amended lawsuit also includes allegations from a former Fairfax police detective, who says his efforts to investigate sex trafficking were thwarted by Barbazette, who was a sergeant and his supervisor.

As the detective, William Woolf, pressed his efforts to investigate, he said he was threatened by high-ranking officers. He said he even received a call from Roessler, whose voice he recognized even though he did not identify himself, saying, "I need to make sure you’re willing to play ball,” according to the lawsuit.

Roessler resigned as chief earlier this year. During his time as chief, Roessler received praise from politicians and activists for his efforts at transparency and his willingness to support criminal charges against officers accused of wrongdoing. But officers on the force overwhelmingly supported no-confidence votes against him conducted by police unions.

Calls and an email to numbers and an address associated with Roessler were unanswered or disconnected.

According to the lawsuit, the Costa Rican woman was recruited in her native country to come to the U.S. and work as an escort, which she was told involved going on dates with wealthy men but would entail prostitution.

But when she arrived in the U.S. in late 2010, the woman who ran the trafficking ring, Hazel Sanchez Cerdas, took her passport and forced her to engage in commercial sex. When the woman said she wanted to leave, Sanchez alternately threatened to harm the woman's family in Costa Rica or tell the family she was a prostitute, according to the lawsuit.

Sanchez pleaded guilty in federal court in Alexandria to running the prostitution ring and was sentenced to 2 1/2 years in prison. Prosecutors in that case said women in Sanchez's operation were required to have sex with up to 17 customers a day, and instructed to comply with requests even for particularly humiliating or dangerous sex acts.

There was debate during the case about the degree to which women were coerced, and defense lawyers argued that the victims had incentives to lie about how they were treated. But prosecutors argued that women did indeed have their passports confiscated and were threatened if they talked about leaving.

Sanchez's lawyer said in court papers that trafficking ring operated from 2010 through 2012, but in the civil lawsuit and in an FBI affidavit, the Costa Rican woman said she was coerced into working for Sanchez through 2015.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I've been saying this for a decade, the Fairfax County Police are corrupt (part 2)

  

Fairfax County Officer Convicted of Sexual Misconduct With Teen Cadet

John Grimes faced three counts of indecent liberties with a minor. He was found guilty of all three counts on Monday.

By NBC Washington Staff • Published December 28, 2021 • Updated on December 28, 2021 at 9:11 am

A former Fairfax County police officer has been convicted of sexual misconduct with a 16-year-old police cadet.

John Grimes faced three charges of indecent liberties with a minor. He was found guilty of all counts on Monday.

Grimes was indicted in July 2021. The department said it learned in December 2019 of the misconduct against the victim, who was a member of the Fairfax County Police Public Safety Cadet Program. Grimes was immediately stripped of his police powers, authorities said.

  Prosecutors said the misconduct began when Grimes took the teen on ride-alongs. The FBI tipped off Fairfax County police after Grimes applied to become a special agent and underwent background checks.

"Crimes in which young people are taken advantage of sexually by individuals in positions of authority within our criminal justice system are particularly repugnant and undermine the public's trust," Steve Descano, commonwealth's attorney for the county, said after the conviction.

"I will always prioritize holding those responsible for such crimes accountable," he said.

The cadet program is designed for youth aged 14 to 21 who are interested in careers in law enforcement.

Grimes was with the department for more than three years. He faces up to 15 years in prison and he’ll have to register as a sex offender.

Unreasonable force (That you paid for out of the taxpayers pockets)

 Clem v. COUNTY OF FAIRFAX, VA, 150 F. Supp. 2d 888 (E.D. Va. 2001)

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia - 150 F. Supp. 2d 888 (E.D. Va. 2001)
July 17, 2001


150 F. Supp. 2d 888 (2001)

Robert CLEM, Plaintiff,
v.
COUNTY OF FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. A. 00-1684-A.

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division.

July 17, 2001.

*889 Brien Anthony Roche, Johnson & Roche, McLean, VA, for plaintiff.

Cynthia L. Tianti, Assist. County Atty., Fairfax, VA, for defendants.

 
MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELLIS, District Judge.

This action is a Section 1983[1] excessive use of force, gross negligence, and assault and battery suit brought by plaintiff Robert Clem, a 58-year-old male who suffers from depression and dementia, against defendants County of Fairfax, the County's Chief of Police, and two individual officers, Shannon Corbeau and Eric Nelson. Following a hearing, summary judgment was entered in favor of all defendants, except Officer Corbeau.[2] Cross-motions for summary judgment relating to Officer Corbeau were denied on the ground that triable issues of fact remained with respect to whether Officer Corbeau is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions in shooting plaintiff three times.[3] Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to alter or amend this ruling. This Memorandum Opinion sets forth the reasons for the denial of summary judgment for Officer Corbeau on qualified immunity grounds and also resolves plaintiff's motion to alter or amend.

On November 9, 1998, plaintiff's wife called 911 and advised the dispatcher that plaintiff, who had mental problems, had not eaten in three days, was refusing to go to his doctor's appointment, was urinating on the floor, and was dropping lighted cigarettes on the floor. The dispatcher labeled the call a "mental case," and Officers Corbeau and Nelson responded. Before entering plaintiff's residence, Officer Nelson informed Officer Corbeau that approximately six weeks earlier, Officer Nelson and another officer had responded to a similar call from plaintiff's wife, who complained that plaintiff had threatened her with a knife. On this earlier occasion, the officers were able to persuade plaintiff to attend his scheduled doctor's appointment.

When the officers entered the residence, plaintiff was seated at the kitchen table. Officer Corbeau testified that plaintiff appeared "slightly out of it." Once inside, Officer Nelson attempted to persuade plaintiff to keep his doctor's appointment. These efforts, at least initially, were successful, as plaintiff stated that he was willing to keep the appointment. Accordingly, Officer Nelson assumed the situation was under control, and called off the units en route to provide back-up support.

Then, the situation changed abruptly. Plaintiff changed his mind about keeping his doctor's appointment. In response, both officers renewed their efforts to encourage plaintiff to see his doctor. Officer Corbeau testified that plaintiff responded by stating he would kill Officer Corbeau and while patting his front right pants pocket, plaintiff further declared that he had "something that could beat anything that [Corbeau] had on his belt." Plaintiff's nephew, who was present at the time, disputed Officer Corbeau on this point. He stated, instead, that plaintiff never threatened the officers, but did pat his pocket and state that "you think that I am afraid of you because of your badge." Mrs. Clem also disputed Officer Corbeau's testimony on this point; she agreed with the nephew's account that plaintiff never threatened either Officer Corbeau or Officer Nelson. Officer Nelson supported Officer Corbeau's testimony, although his support is arguably contradicted by the first statement he provided in the course of an interview on the date of the shooting. In that interview, Officer Nelson never mentioned that plaintiff had patted his pocket or threatened defendant. Later that day, however, Officer Nelson did confirm Officer Corbeau's version of plaintiff's statement. Yet, significantly, during this same interview, Officer Nelson also stated that he was certain that plaintiff was unarmed, despite plaintiff's threat, because plaintiff's shirt was open and he could see that plaintiff had no weapons in his front pocket or tucked into his waistband.

Immediately following the disputed statement, plaintiff, with no warning, jumped out of his seat and with his arms up in the air began moving toward Officer *891 Corbeau. Plaintiff's wife and Officer Nelson attempted unsuccessfully to restrain him. Officer Corbeau, in response, used his pepper spray on plaintiff because he felt that plaintiff "posed an immediate threat of serious bodily injury."[4] As it happened, the pepper spray also struck Officer Nelson, plaintiff's wife, and plaintiff's nephew. Because it appeared that the pepper spray had momentarily stopped the plaintiff, Officer Nelson directed plaintiff's nephew to escort plaintiff's wife to the bathroom to wash her face, and Officer Nelson then went to the front door to radio for additional support.

After being sprayed with pepper spray in the breakfast area by Corbeau, plaintiff entered the living room area where Officer Corbeau was located. When Officer Nelson returned from his radio call, plaintiff began moving toward him. Officer Nelson stated that plaintiff used profanity and swung his arms "like he [was] reaching out to punch [me]." Officer Nelson pulled out his pepper spray and repeatedly warned plaintiff to keep his distance. According to Officer Nelson, these warnings went unheeded and although he backed away from plaintiff, plaintiff attempted to strike Officer Nelson.[5] Officer Nelson deflected the attempt and then used his pepper spray on plaintiff.[6]

Following this, plaintiff began moving toward Officer Corbeau, who retreated by moving into a hallway that connected to the living room. Officer Corbeau described plaintiff's movement toward him as extremely fast, his countenance as snarling, his eyes as bulging out, and plaintiff as showing no apparent reaction to the pepper spray. Officer Corbeau also stated that plaintiff's arms were flailing about and that he swore that he was going to kill Officer Corbeau. Officer Nelson corroborated Officer Corbeau's description of plaintiff's movement and threats.[7] As plaintiff continued to approach at Officer Corbeau, Officer Corbeau repeated his *892 warnings to plaintiff to stop advancing.[8] By this time, Officer Corbeau retreated approximately four feet down the approximately fifteen-foot hallway, unholstered his gun, and shot plaintiff three times, once in the groin and twice in the torso area. Officer Corbeau stated that he was forced to shoot from the hip because plaintiff's proximity prevented him from extending his arm. After being shot, plaintiff took a few steps away from Officer Corbeau and fell onto his side.

On September 1, 2000, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against in the Fairfax County Circuit Court. Count I alleges that defendants violated plaintiff's federal constitutional rights as guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Counts II and III are Virginia state law claims for gross negligence and assault and battery, respectively. On October 11, 2000, defendants removed the case to federal court. Then, on April 13, 2001, plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment, and each defendant responded by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment. After briefing and oral argument, summary judgment was granted in favor of Officer Nelson, Chief Manager, and the County of Fairfax on all counts. See Clem v. County of Fairfax, Civ. A. No. 00-1684-A (E.D.Va. May 29, 2001) (Order). Summary judgment was granted in favor of Officer Corbeau on the excessive force claim relating to his use of pepper spray, but was denied in all other respects. See id. At issue here is whether Officer Corbeau is entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the cause of action in Count I, which alleges that the use of deadly force in the circumstances was a violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.

 
II.

Government officials are entitled to qualified immunity for civil damages to the extent that "their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."[9] More specifically, "[a] police officer should prevail on an assertion of qualified immunity if a reasonable officer possessing the same information could have believed that his conduct was lawful."[10] And, where a defendant seeks qualified immunity, "a ruling on that issue should be made early in the proceedings so that the costs and expenses of trial are avoided where the defense is dispositive." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. ___, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 2156, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001).

Qualified immunity applies only in the context of a validly alleged constitutional *893 violation. Without such a violation, qualified immunity is obviously unnecessary; in that event, the underlying claim would simply fail. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 114 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1991). Thus, the threshold question that must be addressed before engaging in the qualified immunity analysis is whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, establish that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. See Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2156; Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232, 111 S. Ct. 1789. This question is easily answered here in the affirmative, given plaintiff's allegation that Officer Corbeau violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of deadly force unless the "officer has sound reason to believe that a suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others."[11] Specifically, plaintiff argues that Officer Corbeau shot him (three times) under circumstances that did not warrant or justify the use of deadly force. In this regard, plaintiff alleges that he was unarmed, that he posed no threat of serious bodily injury to Officer Corbeau or others, and finally, that Officer Corbeau could not and did not perceive that plaintiff posed such a risk. These allegations, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, state a valid claim for excessive use of police force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Given that plaintiff has alleged a valid Fourth Amendment excessive use of deadly force claim against Officer Corbeau, it remains to be seen whether, on the basis of the developed factual record, Officer Corbeau is entitled to qualified immunity.

Because qualified immunity turns on whether the officer's conduct violates a clearly defined constitutional right of which a reasonable officer would have known, the next step in the analysis is to define the constitutional right involved "at the appropriate level of specificity."[12] Once this is done, the qualified immunity analysis proceeds to ascertain whether the right so defined was clearly established at the time of the incident. If the right was not clearly established in the law at the time, no further inquiry is necessary, as qualified immunity is warranted under these circumstances. See Saucier, 121 S. Ct. at 2157. But, if the right infringed was clearly established, a final inquiry is necessary to complete the analysis. This final inquiry asks the fact-specific question whether a reasonable officer could have believed, in the circumstances, that his behavior was lawful.

There is no doubt that the right at issue herethe right to be free from the use of deadly force absent a belief by the officer that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harmhas long been clearly established.[13] So, then, the final question to address is whether it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that Officer Corbeau's use of deadly force "was unlawful in the situation he confronted."[14]*894 To answer this final question, it is necessary to canvass the factual record for what it discloses about what Officer Corbeau knew and perceived at the time, for these are the predicate facts for determining how a reasonable officer would respond in the circumstances at bar. In the context of this case, the final question in the qualified immunity analysis is whether or not it would have been clear to a reasonable officer standing in Officer Corbeau's shoes at the time of the shooting that plaintiff posed a risk of serious physical harm to Officer Corbeau or others. If the undisputed factual record discloses that it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that plaintiff posed such a threat, then Officer Corbeau is entitled to qualified immunity.[15] On the other hand, if the undisputed record discloses that the opposite would have been clear to a reasonable officernamely, that plaintiff did not pose such a risk then Officer Corbeau's claim of qualified immunity would fail. Of course, if the record reflected that the facts concerning what Officer Corbeau knew and perceived are disputed, a final determination on qualified immunity cannot be made, for as the Fourth Circuit recognized, the issue of qualified immunity is "ripe for summary judgment" only "[i]n the absence of a genuine dispute as to the reasonableness of the officers' perceptions."[16]

*895 A close review of the current record compels the conclusion that neither summary judgment nor qualified immunity can be determined at this time because there remain disputes regarding what Officer Corbeau actually perceived and the reasonableness of his conclusion either that plaintiff was armed or that he posed a threat of death or serious physical injury. Specifically, the following two facts remain in dispute: (i) whether plaintiff made a statement in the kitchen that he had "something that could beat anything that [Corbeau] had on his belt" and (ii) whether at the time of the shooting Officer Corbeau actually and reasonably believed that plaintiff was armed. Both of these disputed issues are plainly material. The disputed statement by plaintiff in the kitchen is central to the reasonableness of Officer Corbeau's claim of concern that plaintiff posed an immediate risk of serious physical injury to himself or others. If Officer Corbeau's version of plaintiff's statement is accepted, then Officer Corbeau might be entitled to qualified immunity. Quite clearly, if plaintiff had a gun in his possession, or if it was reasonable to assume that he was armed at the time of the shooting, qualified immunity would be appropriate. This is so because the "Fourth Amendment does not require police officers to wait until a suspect shoots to confirm that a serious threat of harm exists."[17]

On the other hand, if the version of plaintiff's statement offered by plaintiff's wife and nephew is credited, then Officer Corbeau could not reasonably have thought plaintiff was armed. In that event, Officer Corbeau would not be entitled to qualified immunity for the use of deadly force, because he could not reasonably have believed that plaintiff posed an immediate risk of serious physical harm to himself or others. Plainly, police officers cannot use deadly force against a mentally ill person who is neither armed nor reasonably perceived to be armed, and who has committed no crime, merely because of a fear that the person might take the officer's weapon. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11-12, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (defining threat of serious bodily injury).[18] Police officers, who routinely face challenging and life-threatening situations, are not privileged to use deadly force based on no more than this fear. Instead, retreat and/or a lesser degree of force would be warranted in those circumstances, especially where, as here, Officer Corbeau had observed the ease with which Officer Nelson parried plaintiff's advance. It is, of course, inescapable that in analyzing the reasonableness of Officer Corbeau's decision to shoot plaintiff three times, the Court must engage in some amount of "20-20 hindsight," concerning the degree of force employed. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 104 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989); see Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 173 (4th Cir. 1994). But, while "[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence *896 of an uplifted knife,"[19] not only reflection, but a response of lesser force should be expected where there is no knife and no reasonable fear of serious bodily injury.[20]

Moreover, it is disputed whether Officer Corbeau even believed, at the time of the incident, that plaintiff was armed. In his statements immediately after the incident, Officer Corbeau initially stated that the cause of the shooting was not a concern that plaintiff was armed, but rather his fear that plaintiff would be able to take his gun away from him. It was not until a later deposition that Officer Corbeau argued that the shooting was justified because he feared plaintiff might have a weapon. In addition to these inconsistent statements, the veracity of Officer Corbeau's latter statement is questionable in light of the fact that the actions of the officers, up until the moment of the shooting, were inconsistent with a belief that plaintiff was armed. Specifically, neither Officer Corbeau nor Officer Nelson attempted to restrain plaintiff after the first use of pepper spray in the kitchen. In addition, Officer Corbeau stood by and watched when plaintiff began charging at Officer Nelson in the living roomconduct that flatly contradicts a belief that plaintiff was armed. It seems more likely that, had Officer Corbeau genuinely believed plaintiff was armed, he would have drawn his weapon or taken other action to protect Officer Nelson from an armed attack. In short, the record reflects a genuine dispute concerning Officer Corbeau's actual belief at the time of the shooting.

 
III.

Accordingly, the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment must be denied, and for these same reasons, plaintiff's motion to alter or amend must also be denied. This result reflects the clear principle that the qualified immunity doctrine's important purpose of saving officers from the burden and expense of litigation in appropriate circumstances does not trump the parties' right to have a fact-finder resolve disputed issues of fact material to the doctrine's application.

An appropriate Order has issued as to summary judgment, and an appropriate order will issue as to plaintiff's motion to alter or amend.

 Once it is decided that an officer has no reasonable apprehension of immediate serious physical harm or death, the Fourth Amendment excessive force question becomes what degree of force is reasonable in the circumstances. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S. Ct. 1865.